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GENDER DIFFERENCE IN PERCEIVING
VIOLENCE AND ITS IMPLICATION FOR THE
VAWA'S CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
Renge L. Jarusinsky*
INTRODUCTION
What is violence? A typical dictionary definition of violence de-
fines it as "swift and intense force," "rough or injurious physical
force, action, or treatment," and "an unjust or unwarranted exer-
tion of force or power."1 A legal dictionary defines violence as
"[u]njust or unwarranted exercise of force" and "the exertion of
any physical force so as to injure, damage or abuse."'2 Interest-
ingly, studies show that men and women perceive violence differ-
ently, with women perceiving more acts as violent.' The results of
these studies call into question the accuracy of these definitions
and beg the question: What is violence in the context of violence
against women?
In accordance with the results of the studies described above,
social scientists who study violence against women have expanded
the definition of violence when perpetrated against women to in-
clude not only physical acts, but also "visual, verbal, or sexual acts
that are experienced by a [female] as a threat, invasion, or assault
and that have the effect of hurting her or degrading her ... ." The
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2000; B.A., cum laude,
Political Science, Purchase College, State University of New York, 1995. The author
thanks Professor Katherine Franke for her guidance and suggestions on this Note,
Ellen Gesmer for providing the opportunity to research the Violence Against Women
Act's civil rights remedy, which was the inspiration for writing this Note, and her
family and friends for their support.
1. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 1585 (2d ed. 1984).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1570 (6th ed. 1990) (citations omitted). The legal
dictionary also notes that, in some contexts, violence can be more than a physical act;
it may also include "false statements ... and veiled threats by words or acts." Id.
3. See infra Part I.A.2.
4. MARY P. Koss ET AL., No SAFE HAVEN: MALE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
AT HOME, AT WORK, AND IN THE COMMUNITY XVi (1994); see also Rebecca Emerson
Dobash & Russell P. Dobash, Cross-Border Encounters, in RETHINKING VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 4 (R. Emerson Dobash & Russell P. Dobash eds., 1998) (defining
violence against women as "verbal abuse, intimidation, physical harassment, homi-
cide, sexual assault, and rape"); Introduction to UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 9-11 (Nancy A. Crowell & Ann W. Burgess eds., 1996). Supporters of
broader definitions argue that such definitions more accurately represent victims' ex-
periences. See id. at 10.
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differences between men's and women's perceptions of violence
contribute to the confusion surrounding violence against women.
For example, is an act that does not include physical force violent
or is an unwanted sexual touching unaccompanied by a slap or a
punch violent?
Courts are often faced with these types of questions when deter-
mining what constitutes violence in cases brought under the Vio-
lence Against Women Act of 1994 ("VAWA"). Under the VAWA,
victims are afforded a civil rights cause of action ("civil rights rem-
edy") 5 that allows a woman to sue the perpetrator in federal court
for money damages and injunctive and declaratory relief.6 The
VAWA's civil rights remedy has two requirements: 1) that the
plaintiff be a victim of a "crime of violence;" and 2) that the "crime
of violence" be motivated by the victim's gender.7
The first requirement, a "crime of violence," is defined in the
VAWA's civil rights remedy as an act that 1) constitutes a felony
under criminal law ("predicate offense"); 8 and 2) comports with 18
U.S.C. § 16 ("section 16").9 Section 16, a definition that was origi-
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). The VAWA is part of the Violent Crime Control
and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. See Pub. L. No. 103-322; 108 Stat. 1941 (1994).
The VAWA itself contains several provisions, one of which is the civil rights remedy.
See id. Before and since its passage, the VAWA's civil rights remedy has been at-
tacked on constitutional grounds. Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certio-
rari to decide whether the VAWA's civil rights remedy is constitutional. See
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic & State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996),
affd en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 11 (1999).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). While the VAWA's civil rights remedy is gender-
neutral, this Note will address male violence against women. Also, the statute explic-
itly states that a VAWA civil rights claim may be brought in either federal or state
court. See id. § 13981(e)(3). The vast majority of VAWA civil rights cases, however,
have been brought in federal court, such as the cases discussed herein. See cases dis-
cussed infra Part I.B. In addition, the legislative history of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy suggests that "legislators contemplated federal courts as the primary forum
for determination of VAWA civil rights claims." Julie Goldscheid and Susan Kraham,
Litigating Violence Against Women Act Civil Rights Claims: Procedural Concerns, in
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 11-1 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1998).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). The "motivated by gender" requirement raises a
host of complex issues that will not be addressed in this Note. For analyses of the
"motivated by gender" requirement, see Kuhn v. Kuhn, No. 98-C2398, 1998 WL
673629, at *4-7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 16, 1998); Anisimov v. Lake, 982 F. Supp. 531, 540-41
(N.D. I11. 1997); Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 783-85; see also Jennifer Gaffney, Note,
Amending the Violence Against Women Act: Creating a Rebuttable Presumption of
Gender Animus in Rape Cases, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 247 (1997).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d). The statute allows for the predicate offense pleaded
by the plaintiff to be either a federal or state criminal felony, and the statute does not
require that the defendant had criminal proceedings brought against him under these
predicate offenses. See id.
9. See id.
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WHAT IS VIOLENCE?
nally used in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,1" defines a "crime
of violence" as:
(a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or
threatened use of physical force against the person or property
of another, or
(b) any other offense that is a felony and that, by its nature,
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person
or property of another may be used in the course of committing
the offense."
In some VAWA civil rights cases, plaintiffs have alleged predi-
cate offenses that do not contain an element that requires "the use,
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force," pursuant to
section 16(a). 12 In such cases, courts must determine whether the
predicate offense is one that involves a "substantial risk [of] physi-
cal force," pursuant to section 16(b). 3 In the absence of statutory
guidance, courts have developed various and often inconsistent ap-
proaches to determine what constitutes a substantial risk of physi-
cal force to women alleging civil rights violations pursuant to the
VAWA.14
This Note focuses on what acts pose a substantial risk of physical
force to women for purposes of the VAWA's civil rights remedy.
Specifically, this Note addresses the interpretation of section 16(b)
in VAWA civil rights cases. Part I provides a general history and
background of the VAWA's civil rights remedy. First, Part I details
the evolution of the "crime of violence" requirement, and second
presents the congressional intent behind the civil rights remedy.
Part I also provides case illustrations of how federal courts have
interpreted section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases. Part II dis-
cusses traditional understandings of violence against women in the
law and presents social science data showing perceptual differences
of violence between men and women to provide a contemporary
understanding of violence against women. Part II then discusses
the different legal approaches utilized by federal courts to interpret
section 16(b), which often echo the difference between the tradi-
tional and contemporary notions of violence against women. Part
III argues that utilizing traditional notions of violence against wo-
men to interpret section 16(b) rids the VAWA's civil rights remedy
10. See discussion infra Part II.B.
11. 18 U.S.C. § 16 (1998) (emphasis added).
12. See cases discussed infra Part I.B.
13. See id.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981; cases discussed infra Part I.B.
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of any positive effect. Part III proposes that courts employ a
broad, uniform approach to determine what acts pose a substantial
risk of physical force. This Note concludes that utilizing such an
approach would make the VAWA's civil rights remedy the power-
ful tool for which it was created - a tool to benefit both women
and society.
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE VAWA's
CIVIL RIGHTS REMEDY
A. Legislative History15
1. The Evolution of the "Crime of Violence" Language
On June 19, 1990, Senator Joseph Biden introduced the first ver-
sion of the VAWA in the Senate.16 Senate Bill 2754 included a civil
rights cause of action under Title III, which provided that "[a]ny
person... who deprives another of the rights, privileges or immu-
nities secured by the Constitution and laws as enumerated in sub-
section (b) ... shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.' 1 7 Subsec-
tion (b) enumerated the rights referred to above as freedom from
"crimes of violence motivated by the victim's gender." 8 This sub-
stantive right was defined as freedom from "any crime of violence
... including rape, sexual assault, or abusive contact, motivated by
gender. '"19
On October 4, 1990, Senator Biden introduced a substitute bill
of the VAWA at an executive committee meeting of the Judiciary
Committee (the "Committee"). 2 0 This version included significant
changes from the prior bill,21 increasing coverage from only sex
crimes to all crimes of violence motivated by gender.22 After the
Department of Justice complained about the vagueness of what
15. For a comprehensive review of the legislative history of the VAWA's civil
rights remedy, see Victoria F. Nourse, Where Violence, Relationship, and Equality
Meet: The Violence Against Women Act's Civil Rights Remedy, 11 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J.
1 (1996).
16. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 29 (1990); S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301 (1990) (as
introduced).
17. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(c) (as introduced). The language of the civil rights
cause of action in this version was akin to the language of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, but with-
out "an under color of state law" requirement. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 8.
18. S. 2754, 101st Cong. § 301(b) (as introduced).
19. Id. § 301(d).
20. See id. § 301(d) (substitute bill), reprinted in S. REP. No. 101-545, at 43.
21. See id.
22. Compare S. 2754 § 301(d) (as introduced), with S. 2754 § 301(d) (substitute
bill); see also Nourse, supra note 15, at 12.
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acts of violence would be covered, however, the Committee incor-
porated a reference to section 16, which was the federal criminal
code's primary definition of "crime of violence. ' 23 Later that day,
the substitute bill, which incorporated the federal definition, was
adopted by voice vote in the Committee.24
Against strong opposition, Senator Biden re-introduced the
VAWA as Senate Bill 15 on January 14, 1991.25 In response to con-
cerns about the wide range of acts that would be covered under the
civil rights remedy,26 Senator Biden attempted to clarify the "crime
of violence" requirement in this bill.27 By adding reference to sec-
tion 16, the major issue in the "crime of violence" analysis is
whether the defendant's alleged acts can be associated with a crim-
inal offense.28 Senate Bill 15 also contained language stating that a
plaintiff need not file criminal charges nor show a criminal convic-
tion in order to prove that the defendant's acts amounted to a
"crime of violence" under the VAWA's civil rights remedy.29 The
addition of this language was intended to emphasize that a VAWA
civil proceeding was to be governed by civil law, rather than crimi-
nal law.3°
During the term of the 103rd Congress, the VAWA gained con-
siderable support in the House and the Senate.31 Supporters were
23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part II.B.
24. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 12-13.
25. See id. at 13; S. 15, 102d Cong. § 301 (1991). Shortly thereafter, Congress-
woman Barbara Boxer sponsored a companion bill in the House. See Nourse, supra
note 15, at 13.
26. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 13. Opposition came from both state and federal
judges over the fear that cases brought pursuant to the VAWA's civil rights remedy
would "flood the federal courts." See id. Chief Justice Rehnquist publicly stated that
the VAWA's "definition of a new crime is so open-ended, and the new private right of
action so sweeping, that the legislation could involve the federal courts in a whole
host of domestic relations disputes." 138 CONG. REC. 583 (1992) (statement of Chief
Justice William Rehnquist). The ACLU shared the concerns of the Chief.Justice. See
Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender. Hearing on S. 15 Before the Subcomm. on
Civil and Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary House of Representa-
tives, 103d Cong. 20 (1993) [hereinafter Crimes of Violence Hearing]. In response,
Sally Goldfarb pointed out the "sexism" behind the floodgates argument, noting that
the introduction of civil rights causes of action in other legislation, such as the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, only met opposition from staunch civil rights opponents,
and not from the federal judiciary. See id. at 12 (statement of Sally Goldfarb, Senior
Staff Attorney, NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund ("NOWLDEF")).
27. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 14,
28. See id. at 16.
29. See S. 15 § 301(d). fThis language was added to prevent a mini-criminal trial
within a civil-case. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 15.
30. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 14.
31. See id. at 27.
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concerned, however, that the VAWA would be stalled if brought to
the Senate floor for debate and "would become a vehicle for unre-
lated, and extremely controversial, crime amendments such as the
federal death penalty, habeas corpus reform, or gun control legisla-
tion."3 As a result, Senators Biden and Hatch decided to negoti-
ate a bipartisan compromise bill that would deter "hostile floor
amendments. 33
The Biden/Hatch compromise, embodied in Senate Bill 11, made
several changes to the "crime of violence" requirement. 4 Prior
versions of the civil rights remedy contained a reference only to
section 16(a), which covers acts classified as either misdemeanors
or felonies.35 Senate Bill 11 now contained new language limiting
the VAWA's civil rights remedy only to offenses serious enough to
warrant classification as felonies.36 Also, the predicate offense had
to include a risk of personal injury.37
In addition to these limitations, the drafters added language
broadening the "crime of violence" definition to include "acts that
would constitute a felony ... but for the relationship between the
person who takes such action and the individual against whom such
action is taken. ' 38 The purpose of this language was to provide
coverage to victims of relationship-based crimes because the draft-
ers recognized that many states "downgrade" crimes committed by
and against parties in a relationship, such as domestic violence and
acquaintance rape.39 This new language required that the alleged
act be determined by the seriousness of the offense and not by the
relationship between the victim and the perpetrator.40 The addi-
tion of this language embodied one of the substantive goals of the
VAWA - that state and local applications of the term "felony" not
govern the civil rights remedy. 41
The limits on the "crime of violence" requirement were suffi-
cient to garner majority support for the VAWA in the House and
32. Id.; see also S. 11, 103d Cong. § 301 (1993).
33. Nourse, supra note 15, at 27.
34. See id. at 27-29.
35. See id. at 28; see also supra note 11 and accompanying text.
36. See S. 11 § 301(d)(2)(A); see also Nourse, supra note 15, at 28.
37. See S. 11 § 301(d)(2)(A).
38. Id. § 301(d)(1)(A).
39. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 28-29. Crime "downgrading" occurs when a
crime is committed by a party in a relationship against the other party, and the act is
prosecuted as a misdemeanor even though the same crime committed against a stran-
ger would be classified as a felony. See id.
40. See Nourse, supra note 15, at 28.
41. See id.
WHAT IS VIOLENCE?
Senate.42 On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the
VAWA into law.43 Consistent with Senate Bill 11, the VAWA's civil
rights remedy does not reach all injurious actions motivated by
gender. Rather, in its final form, the statute defines "crimes of vio-
lence" as:
act[s] or series of acts that would constitute a felony against the
person or that would constitute a felony against property if the
conduct presents a serious risk of physical injury to another, and
that would come within the meaning of State or Federal offenses
described in section 16 of Title 18, United States Code, whether
or not those acts have actually resulted in criminal charges, pros-
ecution, or conviction .... 44
2. Congressional Intent
In his opening remarks at the first "Women and Violence" hear-
ing before the Committee in October 1990, Senator Biden stated
that "no matter how much we say we have changed as a society,
there is something terribly wrong when, over the last 15 years, vio-
lence against young men in America has dropped by 12 percent,
while violence against young women in America has increased [by]
50 percent. '45 In recognition of society's pervasive "violent sex-
ism," Senator Biden stated that his overarching intention in creat-
ing the VAWA's civil rights remedy was "to change the Nation's
attitude. '46
Along with this ambitious goal, Senator Biden and the drafters
identified at least three additional goals of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy. First, the VAWA's civil rights remedy was intended to rec-
ognize gender-based violence as discrimination and a violation of
an individual's civil rights.47 Congress cited a tradition of fighting
42. See id. at 36.
43. See id.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 13981(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The final form also retains the
requirement that the alleged act be determined by the seriousness of the offense and
not by the relationship between the victim and the perpetrator. See id.
§ 13981(d)(2)(B) (stating that a crime of violence "includes an act or series of acts
that would constitute a felony described in subparagraph (A) but for the relationship
between the person who takes such action and the individual against whom such ac-
tion is taken").
45. Women and Violence: Hearing on S. 2754 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm.,
101st Cong. 2 (1990) (statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr.) [hereinafter Women
and Violence Hearing 1].
46. Id.
47. See id. at 2-5; see also Symposium, The Violence Against Women Act of 1994:
A Promise Waiting to be Fulfilled, 4 J.L. & POL'Y 427, 430-31 (1996) ("The premise of
2000]
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race-based and religion-based violence with civil rights laws and
noted the 1986 U.S. Supreme Court holding that gender-based vio-
lence may constitute discrimination as support for creating the civil
rights remedy.48 Furthermore, Congress recognized the devastat-
ing effects that gender-based violence has on society and the econ-
omy. 49  Congress also noticed that existing civil rights laws
provided protection for gender-based discrimination only in the
workplace.5" Thus, Congress sought to fill the gender gap in cur-
rent civil rights laws and to spearhead a "national commitment" to
fight discriminatory gender-based violence.5 '
Another goal of the VAWA's civil rights remedy was to
supercede discriminatory state criminal and civil laws and to pro-
vide a civil forum for women who might otherwise be barred from
legal redress.52 In the criminal context, for example, Congress
noted that states often "downgrade" 53 rape in marriage, and until
quite recently, many states did not even consider marital rape a
the [VAWA] is that gender-based violence has a systematic impact on women's
equality.").
48. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 40-42 (referring to the Court's holding in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)). The VAWA's civil rights remedy "makes
explicit what the Court has already held: that an assault against a woman simply
because she is a woman is no different than an assault against a black person because
that person is black." Id. at 42-43.
49. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 32-33. Regarding the economic and societal costs
of violence against women, Congress noted that
It is not a simple matter of adding up medical costs, or law enforcement
costs, but of adding up all those expenses plus the costs of lost careers, de-
creased productivity, foregone educational opportunities, and long-term
health problems. Partial estimates show that violent crime against women
costs this country at least 3 billion ... dollars a year .... [Glender-based
crimes and women's fears of those crimes. . restrict the enjoyment of feder-
ally protected rights like the right to employment, the right to public accom-
modations, and the right to travel.... Gender-based crimes violate our most
fundamental notions of equality-that no person's physical security should
be at risk because of an immutable trait, because of race, religion, or gender.
Id. at 33, 43.
50. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 40-42; see also Andrea Brenneke, Civil Rights for
Battered Women: Axiomatic and Ignored, 11 LAW & INEQ. J. 1, 44-53 (1992). Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides a civil rights remedy to victims of sex-based
discrimination only in the workplace. See id. at 50-52; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994). The
VAWA's civil rights remedy aims to attack sex-based violence outside of the work-
place, such as violence that occurs in the home and on the streets. See S. REP. No.
101-545, at 40.
51. S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41.
52. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 43-48 (1992).
53. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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crime.54 Although marital rape is now a crime in all fifty states,
thirty-three states still only allow prosecutions under limited cir-
cumstances, i.e., where there is evidence of physical injury or under
other restrictions. Furthermore, Congress recognized that many
states also "downgrade" rape and assault between unmarried ac-
quaintances.56 In the civil context, for example, Congress noted
that many states still enforce interspousal immunity doctrines,
which often bar women from suing their abusive husbands in civil
court for money damages.57
A third goal of the VAWA's civil rights remedy was to avoid spe-
cific discriminatory practices at the state criminal level, often
termed the "double victimization" problem, by providing access to
federal court.5 8 "Double victimization" refers to the harm that a
victim sustains first by her attacker and second by the criminal jus-
tice system, a system that often falls short of ensuring justice for
her.59 While many states have passed law reforms to address this
issue, these efforts have failed to eradicate gender bias from affect-
ing criminal proceedings in those states.60 Because federal court is
considered to be less biased than state court, allowing VAWA civil
54. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45; see also UNDERSTANDING VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN, supra note 4, at 127 ("For most of Western history, marital rape was not
considered a crime. Its recognition as a crime today is by no means universal and
remains controversial, despite evidence that rape within marriage is often repeated
and extremely brutal.").
55. See S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45 n.50 (citations omitted); Women and Violence
Hearing I, supra note 45, at 64 (statement of NOWLDEF by Helen R. Neuborne and
Sally Goldfarb); RAQUEL KENNEDY BERGEN, WIFE RAPE 4, 150 (1996). In many
states, a husband is exempt from prosecution for marital rape when his wife is legally
unable to consent (i.e., mentally or physically impaired, unconscious or asleep). See
BERGEN, supra, at 150.
56. See Women and Violence, Part 2: Hearing on S. 2754 Before the Senate Judici-
ary Comm., 101st Cong. 2 (1990) (intending to "debunk the myth" that acquaintance
rape is not as violent as stranger rape) [hereinafter Women and Violence Hearing II];
see also BERGEN, supra note 55, at 150-51.
57. See Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 64 (1990) (statement of
NOWLDEF by Helen R. Neuborne and Sally Goldfarb).
58. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 33-41; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 39.
59. See id. at 40-41.
[W]hen the assault is gender-motivated and it takes place in the home or is
sexual in nature, the criminal justice system, in many instances, has not rec-
ognized the crime or has refused to believe its victims .... Despite much
reform, witnesses explained to the committee that vestiges of this legal dis-
crimination remain.
Id.; see also Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 29-33 (testimony of
Maria Hanson); ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN'S EXPERI-
ENCE OF MALE VIOLENCE 83-102 (1985).
60. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 45-46. Studies indicate
that gender bias affects not only juries, but also judges, prosecutors and court employ-
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rights plaintiffs to sue in federal court is an important facet of the
civil rights remedy aimed at avoiding the "double victimization"
problem.6 Indeed, Senator Biden described the federal judicial
system as the "best court system in the world, with the most edu-
cated judges ... and with a set of rules and regulations and a de-
gree of sensitivity that is uniform."62
ees. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41; S. REP. No. 102-197, at 46-48. NOWLDEF re-
ported that:
Instead of focusing on why men batter and what can be done to stop them,
many judges and court personnel ask battered women what they did to pro-
voke the violence. Several state task forces have cited judges who disbelieve
female petitioners Unless there is visible evidence of severe physical injury,
trivialize domestic violence complaints by their demeaning and sexist com-
ments ...and tell the victim seeking relief in criminal court that this is
merely a domestic problem that belongs in family court. The New York task
force found that in some communities judges shunt victims back and forth
between police and family court until they give up seeking protection.
Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 65 (statement of NOWLDEF by
Helen R. Neuborne and Sally Goldfarb). A rape survivor testified that the police
accused her of fabricating her story, even though she had knife wounds and her un-
derwear was missing; they asked her probing questions about her sexual past and
forced her to take a lie detector test. See Women and Violence Hearing H, supra note
56, at 23 (testimony of Christine Shunk).
61. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 41; see also Women and Violence Hearing I, supra
note 45, at 68 (statement of NOWLDEF by Helen R. Neuborne and Sally Goldfarb).
Congress noted that federal judges are insulated from the political pressures that state
and local judges face and they have more control of the jury selection process because
they can "screen out jurors who harbor irrational prejudices" against women victims.
See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42. Congress also intended to give female victims of gen-
der-motivated violence control over their own civil actions. See id. During her testi-
mony before the Committee, one rape victim expressed frustration with the criminal
justice system because she did not have "the benefit of an advocate who could have
spoken to [her about] the [criminal justice] system, and spoken to the system on [her]
behalf." Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 26 (statement of Nancy
Ziegenmeyer). Also, in a civil trial, the plaintiff may compel the defendant's testi-
mony, whereas in a criminal trial, the defendant is afforded constitutional protections
that shield him from testifying, should he so choose. See S. REP. No. 101-545, at 42.
Lastly, in a civil action, the plaintiff's evidentiary burden is to prove the defendant's
actions by a preponderance of the evidence, which is a lower standard than the crimi-
nal standard of proving a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. Con-
gress also noted that the VAWA's civil rights remedy provides for monetary damages,
as well as injunctive and declaratory relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). Some may
question whether monetary damages are collectible against most private defendants.
Because violence against women cuts across all socioeconomic levels in the United
States, however, not all defendants lack resources to pay damages. See Crimes of
Violence Hearing, supra note 26, at 8 (statement NOWLDEF by Sally Goldfarb)
("For some victims, even a damages judgment that cannot be collected (or a [declara-
tory judgment] or injuncti[on]) will be seen as an immensely valuable vindication of
their rights.").
62. Women and Violence Hearing I, supra note 45, at 2 (statement of Senator Jo-
seph R. Biden, Jr.).
WHAT IS VIOLENCE?
As explained above, the VAWA's civil rights remedy was in-
tended to fill "the gender gap in current civil rights laws," and to
avoid discriminatory state laws and practices.63 Equally important
as these intentions is how courts interpret the VAWA's civil rights
remedy in actual cases.64 Part B provides three examples of how
courts have interpreted section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases.
B. Current Interpretations of Section 16(b) - Case Illustrations
Without clear enumeration of what constitutes a substantial risk
of physical force pursuant to section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights
cases, federal district courts have employed different modes of
analysis to interpret section 16(b), often with disparate impact.
1. McCann v. Rosquist 65
Melanie McCann, Noele Nelson and Lisa Nielson were employ-
ees of Bryon Rosquist, a chiropractor.66 Without their consent,
Rosquist sexually assaulted67 each of them by fondling them re-
peatedly and rubbing his genitals against their bodies.68 McCann,
Nelson and Nielson filed a joint lawsuit in federal court against
63. David Frazee, An Imperfect Remedy for Imperfect Violence: The Construction
of Civil Rights in the Violence Against Women Act, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 163, 165
(1993).
64. See id.
65. 998 F. Supp. 1246 (D. Utah 1998), rev'd, 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1999).
Throughout this Note, the district court's opinion in McCann v. Rosquist will be
referred to as "McCann I", whereas the Tenth Circuit's opinion will be referred to as
"McCann II."
66. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. at 1247.
67. The term "sexual assault" throughout this Note refers to any nonconsensual
touching of or contact with the breasts, genitals or buttocks of another.
68. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. at 1248. Each of the three plaintiffs made similar
allegations against Rosquist. Melanie McCann alleged that Rosquist touched her
"breasts, hips, buttocks, thighs, crotch, and pubic bone - sometimes clothed and
sometimes not - on numerous occasions .... ." Brief for Appellant at 2, McCann v.
Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 1998) (No. 98-4049). Specifically, McCann alleged
that Rosquist
unzip[ped] [McCann's] wet suit at a company water skiing party to expose
[her] breasts, pull[ed] out the elastic waist band on McCann's stretch pants
to look down her pants, rubb[ed] his genitals along McCann's body while
'adjusting' her, ma[de] lewd and suggestive comments, talk[ed] constantly
about sex, fondl[ed] her unclothed pubic area while 'adjusting' her, and
pull[ed] McCann's pants down while 'adjusting' her so that he could fondle
her buttocks.
Id. at 3. Noele Nelson alleged that Rosquist "repeatedly patted and fondled [her]
buttocks, thighs, and shoulders [and] ... once rubbed his penis back and forth along
[her] leg [while] adjusting her." Id. Lisa Nielson alleged that Rosquist "touched [her]
breasts" clothed and unclothed. Id. He also "fondled Nielson's hips, thighs, and but-
tocks, and rub[bed] his hand up Nielson's leg near her crotch." Id.
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Rosquist alleging civil rights violations pursuant to the VAWA's
civil rights remedy.69
The district court found that while Rosquist's acts were "offen-
sive and repulsive," those acts were not "crimes of violence" under
the VAWA's civil rights remedy.70 The court found that the alleged
acts fell within the purview of the predicate offense pleaded by the
plaintiffs.71 Nonetheless, the court determined that the acts were
not of the violent nature required to state a VAWA cause of action
because such acts do not constitute criminal offenses that, by their
nature, involve a substantial risk of physical force as required by
section 16(b).72 Moreover, the court stated that "the time, place,
[and] manner.., alleged are not such that the situation could esca-
late into one where there would be a substantial risk that physical
force would be used. ' 73  Thus, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs' case. 4
2. Palazzolo v. Ruggiano75
Donna Palazzolo was a regular patient of Dr. Ruggiano, a psy-
chiatrist, between 1992 and 1995.76 During counseling sessions,
Ruggiano allegedly sexually assaulted Palazzolo on three separate
occasions. 77 On one occasion, while Ruggiano was reviewing Pal-
azzolo's file, he "asked her if there was anything in the file indicat-
ing that she did not need a kiss and a hug."' 78 Palazzolo responded
"No," yet Ruggiano proceeded to put his arms around her shoul-
ders and "pressed his genital area against hers. '79 Palazzolo filed
69. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. at 1247.
70. Id. at 1252.
71. See id. at 1251-52.
72. See id. at 1252.
73. Id. The court further stated that "[aIll of the acts alleged appear to have oc-
curred at work or at social activities under circumstances that would have greatly
discouraged any escalation of contact of the type of violent conduct required within
the meaning of section 16(b) and [the VAWA]." Id.
74. See id. On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's
dismissal, holding that the predicate offense alleged does involve a substantial risk of
physical force pursuant to section 16(b). See McCann II, 185 F.3d 1113, 1121 (10th
Cir. 1998). For discussion of the Tenth Circuit's analysis, see infra Part II.B.1.
75. 993 F. Supp. 45 (D.R.I. 1998).
76. See id. at 46.
77. See id. On the first occasion, Ruggiano placed his arms around Palazzolo's
body while she was being weighed. See id. On the second occasion, Ruggiano
"placed [his] hand on [Palazzolo's] shoulder and pressed his genitals against her but-
tocks." Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
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suit in federal court alleging that Ruggiano's acts violated her civil
rights pursuant to the VAWA's civil rights remedy.80
The district court determined that Ruggiano's acts did not
amount to "crimes of violence."' 81 Palazzolo relied on the state law
criminal felony of second degree sexual assault as her predicate
offense.8 2 The court stated that Palazzolo did not allege that Rug-
giano used force or coercion, an element of the predicate offense
she alleged.83 Further, the court found that Ruggiano did not use
force or coercion during any of the three incidents because Palaz-
zolo did not manifest a lack of consent.8 4 The court also found that
the section of the predicate offense alleged by Palazzolo that refers
to engaging in medical treatment of the victim for the purpose of
sexual arousal does not pose a substantial risk of physical harm.85
Thus, according to the district court, Ruggiano's actions did not
pose the substantial risk of physical force required by the civil
rights remedy.86 Accordingly, Palazzolo's case was dismissed. 87
80. See id.
81. See id. at 47-49.
82. See id. at 47. This statute states, in pertinent part, that "[a] person is guilty of a
second degree sexual assault if he or she engages in sexual contact with another per-
son and if... [t]he accused uses force or coercion" or "[t]he accused engages in the
medical treatment or examination of the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal,
gratification or stimulation." R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-37-4 (2) & (3) (1998).
83. See Palazzolo, 993 F. Supp. at 48. Rhode Island law requires that the force or
coercion used by the accused in committing second degree sexual assault must "over-
come the victim" and "must be something more than the sexual contact itself." Id.
(citations omitted). "Force that 'overcomes' the victim" means "physical force or
contact taking place after the lack of consent has been manifested .... Any conduct
making it clear that the victim does not consent to the contact is sufficient." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
84. Id. Regarding the first two incidents, the court noted that these incidents were
"unexpected and lasted only a few seconds," that "Palazzolo herself does not claim
that she expressed any disapproval or otherwise reacted to the contact," and that
Palazzolo did not "allege that Ruggiano made any further advances." Id. Therefore,
the court reasoned, "there is no evidence that any such force or coercion was em-
ployed." Id. Regarding the third incident, the court based its determination on the
fact that Ruggiano did not know that Palazzolo was not consenting to his advances
until she pushed him away after he embraced her. See id. Also, the court noted that
"Ruggiano made no further advances after that manifestation of resistance." Id.
85. See id. at 49. The court noted:
[T]here would be little reason for a doctor to employ physical force in such a
situation. Patients who see doctors for medical treatment commonly recog-
nize the likelihood that an examination and perhaps some physical contact
will take place and they readily consent. Having obtained such consent, al-
beit 'nder false pretenses, a doctor who conducts the examination for im-
proper reasons would have little need to resort to physical force.
Id.
86. See id.
87. See id. at 47-49.
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3. Smathers v. Webb88
At a party, Debra Smathers witnessed Daniel Webb sexually as-
sault her thirteen-year-old niece." Later, Smathers told the young
girl's mother, who is Smathers' sister, about the incident and en-
couraged her to contact the authorities. 90 Smathers' sister told
Webb about this conversation. 91 As a result, Webb left "five
harassing, intimidating, and threatening phone messages on Ms.
Smathers' answering machine," in an effort to keep Smathers from
reporting him to the authorities for the sexual assault he commit-
ted upon her niece. 92 In one message, Webb stated, "I have noth-
ing else to do but fuck with you for the rest of my life and rest of
yours. Just to give you a hard god damned time, bitch. 93
Smathers pleaded two predicate felonies in her complaint: (1)
malicious harassment; and (2) the crime of civil rights intimida-
tion.94 In its memorandum opinion, the district court examined
Webb's messages and found that the messages did not "threaten
the use of physical force against the plaintiff, nor did any of the
alleged messages present a risk of serious physical injury to the
plaintiff. '95 Accordingly, the court dismissed Smathers' VAWA
88. No. 3:98-CV-124 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 1998).
89. See Complaint at 2, Smathers v. Webb (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 1998) (No. 3:98-
CV-124) [hereinafter Smathers Complaint]. At a social gathering at Webb's resi-
dence, Webb allegedly "intentionally and forcibly placed his hand upon the breast of
Smathers' niece." Id.
90. See Proposed Amici Curiae Brief of NOWLDEF at 5, Smathers v. Webb (6th
Cir. 1998) (No. 98-5806) [hereinafter "NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief"].
91. See Proof Brief for Appellant at 7, Smathers v. Webb, 1999 WL 1046625 (6th
Cir. 1998) (No. 98-5806).
92. Id.
93. Id. Other portions of these messages are as follows:
You're still a god damned queer bitch and you know it and I know it. ...
Now you want to say anything else about me, we gonna get it right on.
Give me a call by eight o'clock, and I mean now or I'm gonna take a check
somewhere you don't want it to go.
[M]y intentions are to harass the fuck out of you from now to hell on. And
you're gonna get your god damned mouth off of me now, and I mean you're
gonna get your god damned mouth off of me, because I won't get mine off
you.
Id. at 7-8.
94. See Smathers Complaint, supra note 89, at 4-5. The crime of civil rights intimi-
dation under Tennessee law is a felony offense when one injures or coerces "another
person with the intent to unlawfully intimidate another from the free exercise or en-
joyment of any right or privilege secured by the constitution or laws of the state of
Tennessee ... [or] of the United States." TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-309 (1999).
95. See Memorandum Opinion at 2, Smathers v. Webb, No. 3:98-CV-124 (E.D.
Tenn. 1998).
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claim.96 In addition, the court treated the predicate offense of ma-
licious harassment as a claim separate from the VAWA claim.97
The court refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and dis-
missed that claim as well.98
These cases each demonstrate that how a court interprets section
16(b) determines whether a plaintiff will survive a motion to dis-
miss at the district court level.9 9 How each court defines and un-
derstands violence against women will shape its respective
interpretation of section 16(b).
II. INTERPRETING SECTION 16(B) OF THE "CRIME OF
VIOLENCE" REQUIREMENT
Traditional understandings of violence against women in the law
often conflict with how women perceive violence. Part A first dis-
cusses how force, or a risk thereof, has been traditionally defined in
the law in the context of violence against women. Part A then
presents social science data that shows perceptual differences be-
tween men and women in determining what constitutes violence
and what acts pose a substantial risk of physical force. Part B iden-
tifies approaches that courts have adopted to determine "crimes of
violence" pursuant to section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases and
other contexts where section 16(b) is implicated.
A. Traditional Notions of Violence and Gender Difference in
Perceiving Violence
In VAWA civil rights cases, whether an act poses a substantial
risk of physical force is to be determined objectively by a court as a
matter of law.100 How a court defines violence or risk of force will
shape that court's determination. Part 1 discusses how violence
against women has been defined traditionally in the law. Part 2
addresses the contemporary understanding of violence against wo-
men, showing that there are fundamental perceptual differences in
what acts pose a substantial risk of physical force between men and
women.
96. See id. at 2-3.
97. See id. at 3.
98. See id. ("To the extent that the plaintiff also claims a violation of [malicious
harassment], the court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over this
claim, and this claim will be dismissed, also." (citation omitted)). The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of Smathers' case. See Smathers v. Webb, No.
98-5806, 1999 WL 14046625 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999).
99. See supra notes 73, 85 and 95 and accompanying text.
100. See Doe v. Hartz, 970 F. Supp 1375, 1402-03 (N.D. Iowa 1997).
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1. Traditional Notions of Violence Against Women
To understand traditional notions of violence against women, it
is important to understand the historical underpinnings of rape and
domestic violence laws. A review of the history of the law in these
areas explains the evolution of the law regarding violence against
women and the thinking behind current, albeit traditional, policies
and practices.
Rape law, for example, originated from legal codes that con-
strued rape as a property crime of man against man, where the
violated woman is the property.1°1 Moreover, the common law
definition of rape states that a "man commits rape when he en-
gages in intercourse with a woman not his wife; by force or threat
of force; against her will and without her consent.' 10 2 Implicit in
this definition, a victim must physically resist the attacker and the
attacker must use substantial force during the attack for the act to
be considered rape.10 3 Every jurisdiction in the United States has
traditionally made "force" or "threat of force" an element of the
crime of rape.'0 4
Even in the last two decades, courts have commonly drawn a
distinction between the "force" incidental to the act of intercourse
and the "force" required to convict. 105 To convict, courts have typi-
cally focused on force used to overcome the victim, and have not
considered the act of nonconsensual penetration or touching as
force.'06 This distinction was made in State v. Alston,107 in which
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed a rape conviction. 10 8
101. See Charlene L. Muehlenhard et al., Definitions of Rape and Their Implica-
tions, 48 J. Soc. IssuEs 40 (1992). A famous statement of seventeenth-century Eng-
lish lord chief justice Matthew Hale explains early perceptions of rape: rape is a
charge "easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho' never so innocent." SUSAN ESTRICti, REAL RAPE 5 (1987). Ac-
cording to Hale's definition, because rape is very difficult to prove, the victim "must
first prove her own lack of guilt." Id.
102. ESTRICH, supra note 101, at 8.
103. See id. at 5.
104. See id. at 59.
105. See id. at 60.
106. See id.
107. 312 S.E.2d 470 (N.C. 1984) (cited in ESTRICH, supra note 101, at 60).
108. See id. at 471. In Alston, the defendant was the victim's ex-boyfriend when the
alleged rape occurred. See id. The court noted that during their relationship the de-
fendant had been physically abusive and that his girlfriend often had sex with the
defendant just to accommodate him. See id. ("On those occasions, she would stand
still and remain entirely passive while the defendant undressed her and had inter-
course with her."). The relationship ended when the defendant struck his girlfriend,
after which she moved out. See id. at 472-73.
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One month after their relationship ended, the defendant went to
his ex-girlfriend's school, grabbed her arm, stated that she was
coming with him and threatened to physically assault her.10 9 After
she told him she did not want to have sex with him, he pulled her
up, undressed her, pushed her legs apart, and penetrated her.110
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that the element of force
had not been established by substantial evidence, although the
court found that the act of sexual intercourse was nonconsen-
sual. 111 This decision shows that a legal definition of rape requires
more than the forceful acts displayed by the defendant, such as
grabbing the victim's arm, threatening to hit her, undressing her,
pushing her legs apart and penetrating her, thereby demonstrating
how the common law definition has affected current rape law.'1 2
Sentencing proceedings can also be affected by how a court
chooses to define "force." When sentencing rapists, judges often
remark about the type of force that was used by the defendant in
particular cases. For example, in 1992 Ernesto Garay was con-
victed of anally raping and sexually abusing a retarded woman.' 13
At the sentencing hearing, the judge stated that "'there was no vio-
lence here. There was an act."" 14 In 1991, a judge "imposed a
suspended sentence on a prominent businessman convicted of
rape, stating that the victim had sustained no physical injuries. 115
Like the origins of rape law, legal understandings of domestic
violence also originate from the concept of women as property of
men.116 Under British common law, the wife legally became the
109. See id. at 472-73. In particular, the defendant told her that he was going to
"fix" her face to show he "was not playing," and stated that he had a "right" to have
intercourse with her again. Id.
110. See id.
111. See id. at 471.
112. See ESTRICH, supra note 101 at 61-63.
113. See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Maiming the Soul: Judges, Sentencing and the Myth
of the Nonviolent Rapist, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 439, 439 (1993). The victim was a
twenty-three-year-old retarded woman with an I.Q. of 51 who behaved as a young
child. See id. Garay raped the young woman in a bathroom of the building where she
lived and where Garay worked as a custodian. See id. at 441. A carpenter discovered
them while Garay was pinning the victim's hands to the wall and anally raping her.
See id. at 441-42.
114. Id. at 440 (quoting the transcript of New York v. Ernesto Garay, No. 669/91
(Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 1992)). The judge agreed with the defense attorney's characteriza-
tion of this rape as non-violent because the medical evidence showed no bruises,
scratches or lesions on the victim's vagina or anus. See id. at 442.
115. Id. (The judge stated, "I think it was obvious it was non-consensual sex, but I
don't believe it was a violent act as most people think of rape.").
116. See Brenneke, supra note 50, at 22.
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property of her husband upon marriage.117 The implication of this
phenomenon was "legal non-intervention in marital relation-
ships.""18 Because wives became property of their husbands upon
marriage, British common law allowed husbands to discipline their
wives, but "only blows with a switch no wider than a man's thumb
were allowed."' 19 This rule came to be known as the "rule of
thumb."' 2 °
The "rule of thumb" and a husband's right to discipline his wife
were also recognized in the United States.' 2' While the "rule of
thumb" is an "increasingly outdated misconception," domestic vio-
lence continues and is often met "with little social or governmental
intervention.' 1 22 Moreover, although advocacy efforts have been
successful in enforcing criminal laws against domestic violence and
have improved law enforcement policies toward domestic violence,
the notion of domestic violence as a "private" matter remains. 23
For example, in 1995, a New York jury acquitted a man who
clubbed his ex-girlfriend with a length of four-inch wire cable and
117. See id.
118. Id. At British common law, the state did have an obligation to protect the civil
rights of its citizens, but this obligation did not reach relations between married
couples. See id. British common law did reach domestic violence, however, but only
when such violence "extended beyond the wife." Id. at 23. For example, when a
pregnant woman was beaten, a crime was committed only if the baby died in her
body, while no crime was committed if the pregnant women was personally injured.
See id.
119. Id. at 22-23. Specifically, husbands were expected to answer for their wives'
misbehavior. See id. Thus, the common law afforded husbands the right to give their
wives "'moderate correction,"' and the right to restrain their wives by "'domestic
chastisement."' Id. (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS
OF ENGLAND, FIRST BOOK 432 (Dawsons of Pall Mall ed., 1966)).
120. See id. at 23. ("This 'rule of thumb' created a distinction between single blows
with large sticks and repeated blows with small sticks irrespective of the damage.").
121. See id. For the first time in the United States, the Mississippi Supreme Court
recognized the "rule of thumb" and its rationale in 1824, and supported a husband's
defense on charges for assault and battery of his wife. See id. at 23-24; Bradley v.
State, 1 Miss. 156 (1824). Later, in 1864, a North Carolina court also followed the
"rule of thumb" and stated that "a husband is responsible for the acts of his wife, and
... the law permits him to use .. .a degree of force as is necessary to control an
unruly temper and make her behave herself." Brenneke, supra note 50, at 24 (quot-
ing State v. Black, 60 N.C. 262 (1864)). While both of these holdings were later over-
turned, the stigma against a "public display of familiar strife remained strong."
Brenneke, supra note 50, at 24. Domestic violence was rarely spoken about in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and legal support was unavailable for vic-
tims of domestic violence because of interspousal immunity doctrines and marital
rape exceptions. See id. at 24-25. See also discussion supra notes 55-59 and accompa-
nying text.
122. See Brenneke, supra note 50, at 25-26.
123. See id. at 26.
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stabbed her in the head with four different knives for ending their
relationship. 124 After the verdict, one juror stated, "Hey - men
and women fight."'1 25
2. Contemporary Understandings of Violence Against Women
and Social Science Data
Social scientists, psychologists and feminists have argued that
traditional notions of violence against women perpetuate myths,
not realities. Scholars have argued that one of the common myths
about male violence against women is that certain acts are not ac-
tually harmful.126 For example, if a woman was sexually assaulted,
but that assault did not result in physical markings such as bruises,
the cultural myth is that the woman was neither culturally nor le-
gally wronged. 27 Similarly, if a wife was battered by her husband
but no bones were broken, the myth is that she was not wronged. 128
Scholars argue that such myths often minimize or cover up the
harmful effects of violence against women, and prevent "the devel-
opment of effective policies and programs designed to prevent such
violence.' '1 29
Moreover, as can be seen from the cases described previously,
such myths "pervade our legal system."13 Indeed, some feminist
legal scholars have recognized that women's perspectives on im-
portant legal issues surrounding sexuality, work, family and vio-
lence against women have been ignored in the law.1 3'
Traditionally, a legal understanding of violence against women in
the law came from the male perspective because legal definitions
of rape and other crimes against women "have been written almost
124. See Stasi, Men & Women Fight, N.Y. POST, May 15, 1995, at 4.
125. Id.
126. See Koss, supra note 4, at 9.
127. See id.
128. See id.
129. Id. ("It is through gender-related roles that specific cultural norms related to
gender and violence are patterned, learned, and transmitted from generation to
generation.").
130. See Koss, supra note 4, at 9 (citation omitted); see also supra Part I.B.
131. See Leslie Bender, From Gender Difference to Feminist Solidarity, 15 VT. L.
REV. 1 (1990); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a
Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985). Such scholars
have suggested a new approach to lawmaking that would eradicate the "tradition of
perspectivelessness in legal thinking with a broadened concept of objectivity including
multiple perspectives-the views of women, African-Americans, Native Americans,
Asian-Americans, and others." MONA HARRINGTON, WOMEN LAWYERS: REWRITING
THE RULES 60 (1994).
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exclusively by male legislators. ' 132 Thus, feminist legal scholars
have argued that such "[c]onventional definitions.., tend to be too
narrow" and "serve to advantage men over women. "133
One commentator has argued that women's experiences of sex-
ual and physical violence are often "[c]ast in a mould constructed
within a male-dominated society," and as a result, such experiences
"take on an illusion of normality [and] ordinariness."'1 34 What
some men may see as normal and ordinary behavior, many women
consider potentially violent.135 Social science research confirms
this disparity. 136
A recent study of heterosexual couples examined and compared
male and female accounts of specific incidents of male violence
against women. 137 The researchers found a "pronounced discor-
dance" between what men and women perceive as violent (or po-
132. See Muehlenhard, supra note 101, at 23-24. This psychology professor has ar-
gued that, "In patriarchal social systems, men have controlled oral and written pro-
duction of language. This 'man-made language' reflects and reifies the experiences of
men. To the extent that this language does describe the experiences of women, it does
so from the perspective of men." Id. at 40. Moreover, "a male-defined concept of
violence - [one] premised on a school yard fist fight or a barroom brawl - and lack of
knowledge about rape trauma produce erroneous assessments of rape and erroneous
sentences for rapists." Schafran, supra note 113, at 441.
133. See Muehlenhard, supra note 101, at 40. Professor Muehlenhard continues
that
[i]t is in the patriarchy's best interest to promote images of 'real rape' by
strange men. These images keep women frightened and act as a form of
social control, keeping women off the streets and out of male territory, and
thus limiting women's freedom. They also promote the idea that women
need to attach themselves to one man who will protect them from others
(even though women are more likely to be raped by dates and husbands
than by strangers). They promote the idea that women need to do whatever
it takes to maintain relationships with their male protectors. If women be-
come less wary of stranger rape and more wary of acquaintance rape, this
would decrease the social control of women as well as men's sexual access to
reluctant women.
Id. at 40-41.
134. STANKO, supra note 59, at 9.
135. See id. at 10.
136. Most courts have been unwilling to rely on social science research in support
of holdings. One exception has been in the area of sexual harassment where some
courts have relied on "perceptual difference research," which is the type of research
presented herein, to support a reasonable woman standard. See Barbara A. Gutek &
Maureen O'Connor, The Empirical Basis for the Reasonable Women Standard, 51 J.
Soc. IssuEs 151, 160 (1995); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991).
137. See Russell P. Dobash et al., Separate and Intersecting Realities: A Comparison
of Men's and Women's Accounts of Violence Against Women, 4 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 382 (1998).
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tentially violent). 138 The findings indicated that three-fourths of
the women reported incidents of serious violence, while less than
half of the men reported such incidents.139 Moreover, thirty per-
cent more women characterized incidents of choking, demanding
sex and threats on their lives as serious violence. n0 One-third of
the women sampled reported being kicked or punched in the stom-
ach when pregnant, while approximately one-tenth of the men
sampled reported engaging in such acts. 41
Studies also show that women often perceive certain non-physi-
cal acts as posing a substantial risk of physical force. In one study,
women described flashing (exposure of the male genitals) as poten-
tially violent. 142 Such behavior, especially when it occurs in a de-
serted place, "may engender fears of injury and death because of
the uncertainty about what may happen next. ' 143 In addition,
"[a]ggressive forms of demeaning and intimidating behaviors-
such as threatening violence, feigning to strike, and aggressive
pointing-when used by someone who is larger, stronger, and
more aggressive" are often experienced as frightening and poten-
tially violent.14 4
Disparities also arise between male and female perceptions of
sexual assaults. 145 Studies show that men interpret certain behav-
iors more sexually than do females. 146 There are also significant
differences between male and female views of sexual touching.1 47
138. Id. There were also striking differences between men's and women's percep-
tions of the effects of violent acts. See DOBASH & DOBASH, supra note 4, at 157-58.
Over one-half of the women reported feeling nauseous or vomiting after a violent
incident, whereas only seven percent of men reported inflicting such harm. See id.
Forty percent of women reported being knocked unconscious on at least one occa-
sion, while only 14% of men reported inflicting such an injury. See id. at 158.
139. See Dobash, supra note 137, at 395. For the purposes of this study, "serious
violence" included punching of the face and/or body, kicking and dragging by the
hair. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. In regards to controlling and coercive behaviors, men reported that
they rarely "attempt[ed] to intimidate and coerce their partners." Id. at 404. Most of
the women in the survey, on the other hand, reported that intimidating and control-
ling behavior was "nearly continuous" and "repetitive," and an "integral aspect of
their relationships." Id.
142. See STANKO, supra note 59, at 11.
143. Id. (citation omitted).
144. Dobash, supra note 137, at 404.
145. See id.
146. See Muehlenhard, sup.ra note 101, at 29-30.
147. See Gutek & O'Connor, supra note 136, at 154.
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Eighty-four percent of women defined sexual touching as sexual
harassment, as opposed to fifty-nine percent of men.148
In the context of rape, studies show that acquaintance rape ac-
counts for eighty percent of all rapes. 14 9 The element of force that
is required in many criminal definitions of rape implies that the
penetration itself is neither forceful nor violent.1 50 While the myth
is that acquaintance rape is a non-violent act, studies show that the
effects of sexual assaults between acquaintances are profound.' 5'
One study showed that seventy percent of rape victims reported no
physical injuries, twenty-four percent reported only minor physical
injuries and just four percent sustained serious physical injuries. 52
However, half of rape victims, whether they suffered physical in-
jury or not, became fearful of death or serious injury during the
rape.' 53
Moreover, many rape survivors suffer from psychological inju-
ries. 15  Approximately one-third of victims developed Rape-Re-
lated Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome, one-third experienced
major depression and one-third contemplated suicide. 55 Rape vic-
tims from that study were thirteen times more likely to have seri-
ous alcohol problems and twenty-six times more likely to have
major drug abuse problems than non-victims "because they turned
to substance abuse to medicate their psychic pain."156 Moreover, a
study of approximately five hundred female college student rape
victims, a vast majority of whom were victims of non-stranger rape,
found no difference between victims of stranger rape and victims of
non-stranger rape regarding psychological trauma symptoms such
as depression and anxiety.1 57 One scholar has argued that because
of the profound psychological injury suffered by all rape victims,
148. See id.
149. See Schafran, supra note 113, at 443.
150. See STANKO, supra note 59, at 44 ("Force, perhaps the most the crucial factor
of raped women's experiences, has many forms but its effect is much the same. Physi-
cal or verbal threats are demands, not invitations.").
151. See Schafran, supra note 113, at 443, 446.
152. See id. at 443-44.
153. See id. This national study, entitled "Rape in America," was performed by the
National Victim Center and the Crime Victims Research and Treatment Center of the
Medical University of South Carolina over a four-year period and its results were
released in April 1992. See id. at 443.
154. See id. at 443, 446 ("The carving up of a rape victim's soul is an invisible crime,
but the victim [of acquaintance rape] is no less maimed than the victim of a physical
assault.").
155. See id. at 444. Thirteen percent of victims actually attempted suicide. See id.
156. Id.
157. See id.
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judges should "recognize that all rapes, by definition, are
violent."' 58
This social science data shows that traditional notions of violence
against women are often at odds with women's experiences. That
is because traditional notions of violence against women are based
on male rather than female perceptions. In the context of the
VAWA's civil rights remedy, how a court determines when an of-
fense poses a substantial risk of physical force will depend on
whether the court has a traditional understanding or a contempo-
rary understanding of violence against women.
B. Approaches to Interpreting Section 16(b)
The "crime of violence" definition of section 16 as incorporated
into the VAWA's civil rights remedy was originally used for federal
criminal sentencing purposes. 59 When Congress created this statu-
tory definition in 1984, its intent was to "expand the 'crime of vio-
lence' concept while creating a universally applicable definition of
the term. ' 160 In 1989, the Sentencing Commission eliminated ref-
erence to section 16 in the guidelines, and redefined the term "in a
more inclusive fashion."' 16' The new definition was intended to
give "federal courts the ability to use a low threshold of force in
determining whether acts constitute crimes of violence.' 162
The language of the new definition is substantially similar to sec-
tion 16(b), 63 although the new definition has no binding effect on
the interpretation of the VAWA's civil rights remedy. 164 However,
courts interpreting section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases have
158. Id. at 453.
159. See David Frazee, Crime of Violence Requirement, in VIOLENCE AGAINST WO-
MEN 9-7 (David Frazee et al. eds., 1998) (citing Brenneke, supra note 50, at 60). This
definition has been largely dropped in the criminal sentencing context, and is rarely
used. See id. at 9-7 to 9-8.
160. United States v. Johnson, 704 F. Supp. 1398, 1400 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (citing
1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486-87).
161. Brenneke, supra note 50, at 60; see also Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-5, 9-8, 9-
10.
162. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-5.
163. The current sentencing guidelines definition of "crime of violence" is as
follows:
"Crime of violence" includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated
assault, forcible sex offenses, robbery, arson, extortion, extortionate exten-
sion of credit, and burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included ... if
... the conduct set forth.., in the count of which the defendant was con-
victed ... by its nature, presented a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
18 U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 app. n.2 (1998).
164. See Brenneke, supra note 50, at 60.
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attempted to follow approaches taken by courts in the sentencing
guidelines context. 16' These perspectives include the "categorical"
approach and the "actual conduct" approach. 166
1. The "Categorical" Approach
Under the "categorical" approach, a court examines the predi-
cate offense only as it is set forth in the criminal code and does not
consider the actual conduct of the defendant.1 67 The purpose of
the categorical approach was "to create certain categories of crimes
that would be evaluated the same regardless of the state of ori-
gin."'168 Two questions emerge in VAWA civil rights disputes with
regard to this approach: 1) whether VAWA courts should apply
determinations of whether an offense poses a substantial risk of
physical force from the sentencing guidelines context; and 2)
whether VAWA courts should apply the categorical approach with-
out relying on precedent from the sentencing guidelines context,
thereby creating a separate set of jurisprudence to define what of-
fenses pose a substantial risk of physical force.
As previously stated, the new definition of "crime of violence"
under the sentencing guidelines does not bind courts deciding
VAWA civil rights cases.169 Some commentators and practitioners
have argued, however, that courts should follow sentencing guide-
lines cases, "especially when the caselaw interprets Sentencing
Commission language which mirrors the language of section 16. "17
For example, in its amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in Smathers v. Webb, the NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund ("NOWLDEF") argued that the predicate offense of mali-
cious harassment pleaded by the plaintiff is a "crime of violence"
because such an act poses a substantial risk of physical force. 71
NOWLDEF's argument was premised on the fact that in the sen-
tencing guidelines context "[c]ourts have consistently held that
165. See, e.g., cases discussed supra Part I.B.
166. See Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-1, 9-15, 9-20.
167. See id. at 9-15. ("In other words, the 'question is not whether the particular
facts constitute a crime of violence, but whether the crime ... as defined by [state or
federal] law is a crime of violence.'" (citations omitted)).
168. McCann v. Rosquist, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1250 (D. Utah 1998) (citing Taylor v.
United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990)).
169. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
170. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-10 (noting that Congress chose not to use the new
Sentencing Commission definition, but chose to incorporate section 16, a "mostly un-
used statute"); see NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief, supra note 90, at 8.
171. See NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief, supra note 90, at 8.
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making threats are 'crimes of violence.' 117 2 Similarly, in McCann
II, the appellants argued that because sexual assault has been cate-
gorically deemed a "crime of violence" pursuant to language mir-
roring section 16(b) in the sentencing guidelines context, the
defendant's acts of sexual assault should also be deemed "crimes of
violence.'
' 73
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the appellants'
argument and reversed the district court's dismissal of the case.174
Utilizing the categorical approach, the McCann II court held that
Utah's criminal offense of forcible sexual abuse, the predicate of-
fense alleged by the plaintiffs, by its nature poses a substantial risk
that physical force will be used in carrying out the offense, "even
when unaccompanied by rape, bodily injury, or extreme forms of
coercion.' 1 75 In so holding, the court followed United States v.
Reyes-Castro,76 a sentencing guidelines case, as advanced by ap-
pellants. The Tenth Circuit in Reyes-Castro held that sexual abuse
of a child, the "analogous statutory counterpart" to the predicate
offense alleged by appellants, is a "crime of violence" pursuant to
the part of the new sentencing guidelines definition that mirrors
section 16(b).177 The McCann II court noted that the Reyes-Castro
court focused its holding on the fact that the offense was noncon-
172. Id. In support, NOWLDEF cited cases applying the "categorical" approach in
the federal sentencing context. See id. at 8-9 (citing United States v. Bonner, 85 F.3d
522, 527 (11th Cir. 1996) (concluding that "making a threatening telephone call is a
crime of violence" under the "categorical" approach)); United States v. Left Hand
Bull, 901 F.2d 647, 648 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that mailing a threatening letter to a
person is a "crime of violence" under section 16 even though the defendant did not
carry out the threat).
173. See Brief for Appellant at 12, McCann v. Rosquist, 185 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir.
1998) (No. 98-4049) (citing United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377 (10th Cir.
1993)).
174. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1113.
175. Id. at 1121. Utah's criminal offense of forcible sexual abuse provides that:
[a] person commits sexual abuse if... under circumstances not amounting to
rape, object rape, sodomy, or attempted rape or sodomy, the actor touches
the anus, buttocks, or any part of the genitals of another, or touches the
breast of a female, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with another ...
without the consent of the other ....
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-404(1) (1999). The McCann II court noted that it is irrele-
vant that the statute is labeled as "forcible" in making its determination of whether
this offense poses a substantial risk of physical force, and that the analysis requires an
examination of the elements of the statutory definition of the crime. See McCann II,
185 F.3d at 1119 n.5.
176. 13 F.3d 377, 379 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that sexual abuse of a child is a
"crime of violence" pursuant to language in the new sentencing guidelines definition
that mirrors section 16(b)).
177. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1119-20.
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sensual, and not that the victim was a child.178 Because the predi-
cate offense before the court requires that the act be without
consent, the McCann II court reasoned that the Reyes-Castro hold-
ing is applicable to the McCann II case, albeit in a different con-
text.17 9 Further, the McCann II court rejected the district court's
"assumption" that section 16 of the VAWA's civil rights remedy "is
restricted to a certain 'type' of physical force."'' 80 The court stated
that
[tihe very act of nonconsensual sexual contact, which by its na-
ture evinces a clear intention to disregard the victim's dignity
and bodily autonomy, both demonstrates and creates a substan-
tial risk of more serious physical intrusion or the application of
force to ensure compliance. 8
Lastly, the McCann II court recognized that a restrictive definition
of "crime of violence" was not intended by Congress when incor-
porating reference to section 16 into the VAWA's civil rights
remedy. 182
178. See id. at 1119. In Reyes-Castro, the Tenth Circuit "addressed the relationship
between lack of consent ... and the risk of physical force" and stated that:
[b]ecause the crime [of rape] involves a non-consensual act upon another
person, there is a substantial risk that physical force may be used in commit-
ting the offense. It does not matter whether physical force is actually used.
"Our scrutiny ends on a finding that the risk of violence is present."
Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d at 379 (citations omitted).
179. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1119-20.
180. Id. at 1120 (citing McCann I, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1252 (D. Utah 1998)). The
McCann II court stated that
Section 16 only refers to "physical force"; it does not qualify that reference
by requiring physical force of a particular nature or severity. In fact, the
imposition of nonconsensual sexual contact, whether brought about by brute
force or, as alleged here, by trick and abuse of authority, might itself be
considered a form of violence, capable of causing mental and emotional in-
jury no less severe than the physical injury caused by a blow.
Id.
181. Id.
182. See id.
In enacting the VAWA, Congress recognized the degree to which our na-
tion's systems of law enforcement and adjudication have been complicit in
perpetuating the epidemic of violence against women, in part by failing to
recognize crimes of gender-motivated violence as serious crimes .... We will
not compound that failing today by restricting, in contravention of the lan-
guage of [section 16], the definition of "violence" to only those forms of
violence most traditionally feared by men - murder and serious bodily in-
jury. To adopt such a restriction would be to exclude much of the "wide-
spread incidence of physical assault against women" from coverage of the
VAWA .... It is simply not permissible for us to create, contrary to clear
legislative intent, a special narrower construction of [section 16] for purposes
only of the [VAWA] .....
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Arguments against application of "crime of violence" determina-
tions in the sentencing guidelines context to VAWA civil rights
cases also rely on the congressional intent behind the passage of
the VAWA's civil rights remedy.183 For example, in Smathers v.
Webb, the defendant argued that the congressional intent behind
the VAWA's civil rights remedy was "to protect the civil rights of
victims of gender-motivated violence," and not to protect such vic-
tims from non-violent behavior. 184 One commentator has sug-
gested that perhaps Congress's choice of reference to section 16,
rather than the new sentencing guidelines definition, indicates that
Congress "believed that the two situations differed such that each
should develop an independent definition of 'crime of
violence.' "185
Even if sentencing guidelines rulings should not apply in the
VAWA context, it has been argued that the categorical approach
should be used to determine what offenses pose a substantial risk
of physical force for purposes of the VAWA.186 The district court
in McCann I concluded that, in accordance with congressional in-
tent, "a policy furthering uniformity can and should be applied" in
the context of the VAWA's civil rights remedy.187 The court stated
further that "in order to effectuate the policy of uniformity," a cat-
egorical inquiry should be used whenever possible.188 Paradoxi-
cally, on appeal, the Tenth Circuit court noted that the district
court did not follow the categorical approach, but instead errone-
ously "based its analysis on the particular circumstances of the al-
leged acts in this case." '189 The McCann II court found that the
Id. at 1122 (citations omitted).
183. See Proof Brief for Appellee at 4, Smathers v. Webb, No. 98-5806, 1999 WL
1046625 (6th Cir. Nov. 10, 1999).
184. Id. at 4 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
185. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-10. This commentator notes that:
The purposes of the Sentencing Commission is [sic] to ensure uniform and
proportional sentences for convicted criminals. The purpose of the VAWA is
to provide a minimum threshold for a broad, remedial civil rights statute.
Many of the concerns that arise in the context of criminal sentencing and
punishment simply do not arise in the civil rights arena.
Id. at 9-10, 9-11. He also points out that the legislative history of the VAWA "indi-
cates that Congress merely sought a statutory reference in the U.S. Code and actually
gave no thought to daunting problems of interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16." Id.
186. See McCann I, 998 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (D. Utah 1998).
187. Id. at 1251.
188. Id.
189. McCann II, 185 F.3d 1113, 1116 (10th Cir. 1999). The Tenth Circuit noted that
the district court relied on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), a case in the
sentencing guidelines arena. In Taylor, the Court for the first time established the
categorical approach for determining whether acts are "crimes of violence" pursuant
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categorical approach should be used to determine whether acts are
"crimes of violence" pursuant to section 16 in the VAWA civil
rights context and applied that approach in its analysis. 190
2. The "Actual Conduct" Approach
Under the "actual conduct" approach, a court examines the facts
of each case to determine whether the defendant's acts created a
substantial risk of physical harm.19' This approach differs from the
categorical inquiry because the actual conduct approach requires a
court to focus on the defendant's acts rather than on the abstract
nature of the predicate offense alleged. 92
One of the dangers of the categorical approach is that if a court
rules that an offense does not pose a substantial risk of physical
injury by its nature, then subsequent courts may follow that prece-
dent in cases where the defendant's acts may actually pose such a
risk.' 93 To avoid this danger, proponents of a broad interpretation
of section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases have argued that when
a categorical inquiry fails to result in a "crime of violence" determi-
nation, courts should perform an actual conduct inquiry. 94
to the new sentencing guidelines definition. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1117 (citing
Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600). However, the Taylor Court also noted that the categorical
approach "'may permit the sentencing court to go beyond the mere fact of conviction
in a narrow range of cases,'" which is called the Taylor exception. Id. (citing Taylor,
495 U.S. at 602). The McCann II court noted that pursuant to the Taylor version of
the categorical approach, the district court erroneously concluded that "[the defend-
ant's] particular acts, in context, did not involve a substantial risk of physical force."
Id. After a review of the Taylor exception, the McCann II court concluded that the
Taylor exception only applies to a particular clause of the new sentencing guidelines
definition that does not mirror section 16(b), and therefore does not apply to cases
analyzing section 16(b). See id. Thus, according to the McCann II court, the district
court applied the wrong approach and should have applied the categorical approach.
See id. at 1116.
190. See McCann II, 185 F.3d at 1116 ("We conclude that the language of [section
16] and our precedents require that the crime of violence analysis be conducted at the
level of the statutory definition." (citing United States v. Reyes-Castro, 13 F.3d 377,
379 (10th Cir. 1993)).
191. See Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-11, 9-23.
192. See id. at 9-20. In other words, while the categorical approach is a decontextu-
alized approach, the actual conduct approach is a contextualized approach.
193. See id. at 9-23. For example, in United States v. Fazio, a sentencing guidelines
case, the defendant was arrested for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. See
id. at 9-21 (citing 914 F.2d 950 (7th Cir. 1990)). In Fazio, the defendant struggled with
the police over the weapon. See id. Because the struggle "involved force, danger, and
violence, the defendant's actual conduct sufficiently augmented the possession to
bring it within the scope of crimes of violence" under section 16(b). Id.
194. See id. at 9-22, 9-23, 9-24. In an amicus brief to the Sixth Circuit, NOWLDEF
urged the court first to make a categorical inquiry when interpreting section 16(b),
and if that approach does not lead to a clear result, to then utilize the actual conduct
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One such proponent has noted that the factual inquiry of the
actual conduct approach "well suits the capabilities of a district
court" because the court must find facts anyway. 195 In the sentenc-
ing guidelines context, one of the arguments against the use of the
actual conduct approach has been that courts were required to ex-
amine offenses that occurred in the past "to determine whether to
augment a current sentence for prior conduct," posing practical dif-
ficulties such as unavailable witnesses and lack of evidence, among
others.' 96 In VAWA civil rights actions, this problem does not ex-
ist.197 This proponent also has argued that "it would be anomalous
to exclude actually violent felonious conduct from the scope of"
the civil rights remedy "while protecting conduct that involves a
risk that violence may be used." 98 Moreover, he has noted that
Congress, when deciding to make reference to section 16 in the
VAWA's civil rights remedy, chose not to resolve a split of the
courts as to whether the actual conduct approach should be used in
sentencing guidelines cases. 199 Thus, he has argued that because
civil rights actions demand broad, remedial interpretations, "courts
should favor the interpretation that gives the greatest effect" to the
VAWA's civil rights provision.2 0
Thus far, courts have adopted inconsistent standards for deter-
mining how the civil rights remedy's "crime of violence" require-
ment should be interpreted. In McCann I, the district court stated
that it was utilizing the categorical approach, but nevertheless,
looked to the specific facts of the case to determine whether the
approach to determine whether such conduct constitutes a "crime of violence." See
NOWLDEF's Smathers Brief, supra note 90, at 8.
195. See Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-23.
196. Id. When the Federal. Sentencing Guidelines made reference to section 16,
circuit courts split as to whether courts should use the actual conduct approach in the
sentencing guidelines context. See id. at 9-23 to 9-24. Approximately half of the cir-
cuits allowed some form of the actual conduct approach. See id. at 9-21. These cir-
cuits recognized that some criminal statutory language embodies both violent and
non-violent crimes, and have allowed an actual conduct inquiry in those instances.
See id. Because the guidelines later eliminated reference to section 16, the Supreme
Court has never needed to resolve this split. See id.
197. See id. ("In VAWA actions, courts will almost always make factual determina-
tions from evidence before them. The problems of stale information in VAWA ac-
tions are no greater than in any civil trial.").
198. Id. While this commentator admits that the VAWA's civil rights provision was
not intended to cover all acts of violence motivated by gender, but only "crimes of
violence" motivated by gender, he argues that interpretation of the "crime of vio-
lence" requirement "should not exclude those violent felonies whose commission
sparked the moral outrage which lies at the core of the [VAWA's] passage." Id.
199. See id.
200. Id. at 9-23, 9-24.
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defendant's acts posed a substantial risk of physical harm.2 °1 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit applied the categorical approach. °2 In
Smathers, the district court utilized the actual conduct approach,
relying on the fact that the defendant did not explicitly threaten to
injure the plaintiff physically in his messages.2 °3 On appeal, the
Sixth Circuit also based its decision on Webb's actual conduct. 0°
Finally, in Palazzolo, the district court also utilized the actual con-
duct approach, looking to the specific acts of the defendant in de-
termining whether his acts were "crimes of violence" pursuant to
the VAWA's civil rights remedy.0 5 These courts have taken ap-
proaches that often result in dismissals, thereby denying women a
civil rights remedy and minimizing the significance of gender-moti-
vated violence.
III. A SOLUTION
Reliance on traditional understandings of violence against wo-
men to interpret section 16(b) rids the VAWA's civil rights remedy
of the effect intended by Congress. Thus, in VAWA civil rights
cases, courts should interpret section 16(b) in such a way that takes
into account the broad scope of violent acts that women routinely
sustain in this country. Part A argues that a uniform standard
should be adopted for all courts to apply when interpreting section
16(b). Part B describes what that standard should be. Part C
revisits the cases presented in Part I.B to show how application of
the suggested standard would lead to different results, results that
would be in accordance with women's perceptions of violence.
A. Adoption of a Uniform Standard
Adopting a uniform standard for all courts to apply would be
consistent with the congressional intent in enacting the VAWA's
civil rights remedy. Congress intended to characterize the scope of
violence against women as a problem facing young women
throughout the United States.20 6 Congress also intended to equate
violence against women with violence against other groups by rec-
ognizing gender-based violence as a form of discrimination and as
201. See supra Parts I.B.1. & II.B.1.
202. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
203. See supra Part I.B.3.
204. See Smathers v. Webb, No. 98-5806, 1999 WL 1046625, at *2-3 (6th Cir. Nov.
10, 1999).
205. See supra Part I.B.2.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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an affront to federally protected rights.2 °7 Uniformity is also re-
quired in light of Congress's intent to supercede discriminatory
state laws and practices.20 8 Indeed, these goals would be furthered
by use of a single standard for all courts because such uniformity
would entitle women from different states to the same protection
under the civil rights remedy.
Perhaps even more important in adopting a uniform standard for
VAWA civil rights cases is the definitional history of section 16.
Because Congress created section 16 to provide a "universally ap-
plicable" definition of "crime of violence," albeit in the sentencing
guidelines context, it is unreasonable and inefficient that courts in
the VAWA context are left to their own devices to interpret section
16(b).2 °9
B. The Need For A Broad Approach
Courts should adopt a broad approach to analyzing what consti-
tutes a "substantial risk of physical injury" pursuant to section
16(b). Based on congressional intent and social science data,
courts are not effectuating the purpose of the VAWA's civil rights
remedy.
There has been disagreement over Congress's intent regarding
the scope of acts that would be covered under the VAWA's civil
rights remedy.210 Proponents of a broad interpretation of what acts
create a substantial risk of physical force under section 16(b) have
argued that Congress intended for such a broad application.211 Op-
ponents of a broad interpretation have argued that Congress in-
tended a more limited application.212
An analysis of the congressional intent behind the legislation
reveals that the former interpretation is more plausible than the
latter. Senator Biden's first version of the VAWA's civil rights rem-
edy covered "any crime of violence . . . including rape, sexual as-
sault, or abusive contact, motivated by gender. ' 213 Senator Biden's
substitute version of the same bill included all crimes of violence
motivated by gender.214 After these definitions of "crime of vio-
207. See supra text accompanying notes 47-51.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 52-62; supra note 41 and accompanying
text.
209. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 180, 184 and accompanying text.
211. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 183-184 and accompanying text.
213. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
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lence" were regarded as controversial and withstood opposition
from Chief Justice Rehnquist and civil rights groups, among others,
only then were limitations imposed on the types of acts that the
civil rights remedy would cover.215 To ease the opposition against
the VAWA's civil rights remedy, supporters in Congress acted
quickly to provide a statutory reference to section 16.216 Further-
more, the Tenth Circuit has agreed with this reading of congres-
sional intent.217 Because the current "crime of violence" definition
in the VAWA's civil rights remedy was borne from political com-
promise, it is hardly fair to say that Congress intended to limit such
causes of action to remedy only brutally violent attacks.
The underlying congressional intent behind section 16 for sen-
tencing guidelines purposes also supports the argument for a broad
approach. Congress's intent when enacting section 16 was to pro-
vide a broad understanding of what constitutes a "crime of vio-
lence. 2 18 In addition, the subsequent definition of "crime of
violence" under the sentencing guidelines, containing language vir-
tually identical to section 16(b), was created to be more inclu-
sive. 21 Likewise, When Congress drafted the VAWA's civil rights
remedy, it sought .to create a uniform statute guaranteeing civil
rights protection to all victims of gender-motivated violence.22 °
Utilizing existing precedent from sentencing guidelines cases
would also allow for a broad interpretation of section 16(b) since
courts in those cases have held more acts to constitute "crimes of
violence" pursuant to language that mirrors section 16(b).221 In
line with a broad approach, courts should apply "crime of vio-
lence" determinations from sentencing guidelines cases to VAWA
civil rights cases.222
To understand what constitutes a substantial risk of physical in-
jury under section 16(b), courts should consider the social science
data presented above.223 The cases cited previously224 demonstrate
a phenomenon documented in social science literature: men and
215. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 185.
217. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
218. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 1.61-162 and accompanying text. Compare supra note 11 and
accompanying text with supra note 161.
220. See generally supra Part I.A.2.
221. See supra notes 171-182 and accompanying text.
222. See supra Part II.A.1.
223. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
224. See supra Part I.B.
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women perceive the risk of physical harm differently.225 Two of
these cases in particular, McCann I and Palazzolo, also demon-
strate that some courts determine VAWA civil rights cases from the
traditional perspective of sexual assault as non-violent, rather than
the more realistic understanding of the harm that results from such
acts.226 Because the traditional understanding of what poses a sub-
stantial risk of physical force does not account for how women per-
ceive and experience certain acts, 2 7 courts should consider
nonconsensual sexual assaults as constituting a substantial risk of
physical force irrespective of the particular facts of each case. To
require a higher level of force is to ignore the problem of violence
against women in this country. As it stands, courts are systemati-
cally thwarting the purpose of the VAWA's civil rights remedy, per-
petuating the myth that certain acts taken against women do not
cause harm or create a substantial risk of harm and ignoring the
devastating effects that such violence has on society.228 Therefore,
the social science data provided above should guide courts in inter-
preting section 16(b), by taking into account women's perspectives
and experiences of violence.
With these concerns in mind, courts should seek to provide wo-
men with legal redress for a broad range of acts. To do so, courts
should seek to deem an act a "crime of violence" by utilizing a two-
step approach that includes both the categorical approach and the
actual conduct approach.2 29 Because there is a gender gap in un-
derstanding what poses a substantial risk of physical force, this ap-
proach would allow for a broader range of acts to fall within the
"crime of violence" requirement of section 16(b) thereby allowing
for women's perspectives of violence to be included in the analysis.
Accounting for women's perceptions of violence while utilizing the
two-step process would result in "broad, remedial interpretations"
that civil rights actions, such as the VAWA's civil rights remedy,
demand. 3 °
C. The Cases Revisited
In McCann I, Palazzolo and Smathers, the district courts miscon-
strued the nature of the acts alleged by concluding that such acts
225. See supra Part II.A.2.
226. See discussion supra Parts I.B.1 and I.B.2.
227. See supra notes 133-135 and accompanying text; see also generally Part I1.A.2.
228. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
229. See discussion supra Part II.B.
230. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-23.
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did not involve a substantial risk of physical force.23 1 Had the dis-
trict courts applied the two-step approach and precedent from sen-
tencing guidelines cases and utilized a more contemporary
understanding of the reality of violence against women, all of the
plaintiffs would have survived motions to dismiss.
In Palazzolo, the court's reasoning that Ruggiano's acts did not
amount to "crimes of violence" is flawed. The court stated that
patients readily consent to some physical contact that is likely to
occur during an examination between a doctor and a patient.232 In-
deed, the court trivialized Palazzolo's claims by stating that
"[h]aving obtained such consent, albeit under false pretenses, a
doctor who conducts the examination for improper reasons would
have little need to resort to physical force. '233 Furthermore, the
court implied that unwanted sexual contact is not forceful by its
nature, and does not pose a substantial risk of force, when it stated
that "there would be little reason for a doctor to employ physical
force" in this situation.2 3 4 Utilizing the two-step approach with a
contemporary understanding of what constitutes violence against
women, the court should have come to the determination that the
elements of the Rhode Island statute of second degree sexual as-
sault, by their nature, categorically pose a substantial risk of physi-
cal force. Moreover, if the court applied the holding in Reyes-
Castro, which held that a sexual assault without consent constitutes
a "crime of violence," Palazzolo would have survived the motion to
dismiss.
Likewise, the court's reasoning in Smathers is flawed. Under the
categorical approach, Webb's conduct would have been deemed a
"crime of violence" pursuant to section 16(b) because courts in the
sentencing guidelines context have deemed the making of threats
"crimes of violence" pursuant to section 16(b). 235 Even under the
actual conduct approach,. the court should have determined that
the defendant's messages threatened violence,236 particularly when
he said "I have nothing else to do but fuck with you . . ." and
"you're gonna get your goddamned mouth off of me, because I
won't get mine off you." This alone should be sufficient to pass
muster under section 16(b).
231. See supra notes 85, 93, 106 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
233. Id.
234. See id.
235. See discussion supra Part I.B.3; supra notes 1.63-164 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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WHAT IS VIOLENCE?
The Tenth Circuit's decision in McCann II, reversing the district
court's dismissal, should stand as an example for courts when inter-
preting section 16(b). First, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated a con-
temporary understanding of what constitutes violence against
women and what acts pose a substantial risk of physical force when
it stated:
[t]he very act of nonconsensual sexual contact, which by its na-
ture evinces a clear intention to disregard the victim's dignity
and bodily autonomy, both demonstrates and creates a substan-
tial risk of more serious physical intrusion or the application of
force to ensure compliance.237
The Tenth Circuit recognized, in accord with the social science
data, that nonconsensual sexual contact in and of itself poses a sub-
stantial risk of physical force.238 The Tenth Circuit recognized that
a broader understanding of what constitutes violence against wo-
men is necessary to further the congressional intent in enacting the
civil rights remedy.239 Stating that the categorical approach should
be used in VAWA civil rights cases, the Tenth Circuit followed pre-
cedent from the sentencing guidelines context when it applied the
holding that sexual abuse without consent is categorically a "crime
of violence" because such an act poses a substantial risk of physical
force. 240 Thus, all courts should follow the Tenth Circuit's ap-
proach to interpreting section 16(b) in VAWA civil rights cases.
CONCLUSION
The enactment of the VAWA was viewed as "a potential vehicle
of empowerment" for women, and was a long-awaited move to-
ward gender equality in the United States. 241 By enacting the
VAWA, Congress emphatically expressed a strong commitment to
curb and attack the pervasiveness of sex-based violence.242 In
practice, however, the civil rights remedy has fallen short. In the
few VAWA cases brought under the civil rights remedy, the "crime
of violence" requirement has been interpreted in such a narrow
way that it strips the remedy of any effect.
While there is confusion as to how a' "crime of violence" should
be interpreted, courts should adopt a uniform standard and "favor
237. Supra text accompanying note 181.
238. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
239. See supra note 182 and accompany text,
240. See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
241. Schneider, supra note 47, at 428.
242. See supra text accompanying note 46.
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the interpretation that gives the greatest effect to a broad, remedial
statute such as the VAWA."243 Courts should do this by utilizing a
definition of violence that does not ignore women's experiences.
Moreover, utilizing a two-step approach and applying precedent
determining cases under section 16(b) would broaden the scope of
violent acts that would pass muster under the statute. By broaden-
ing the types of acts that would constitute crimes of violence in
these ways, courts would finally breathe some life into the VAWA's
civil rights remedy and give it the definitional teeth it requires.
243. Frazee, supra note 159, at 9-24.
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